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Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz*
During recent decades, courts and legislatures have devoted a great deal of time
and energy to stamping out various forms of housing discrimination. These efforts have
included a refusal to enforce racially discriminatory covenants,1 the development of
various legal doctrines to police overt racial discrimination in the residential housing
context,2 and numerous statutory initiatives designed to prevent discrimination in housing
sales, leases, and advertising.3 As a result, a real estate developer’s choice of language,
human models, and media are all subject to legal scrutiny.
Despite these governmental efforts, many housing consumers still have
preferences for certain forms of exclusion.4 Some people will want to exclude young
homeowners from a common interest community or apartment complex, and others will
want to exclude the elderly.5 Others may want to exclude members of particular religious
minorities or majorities.6 Still other homeowners may want to exclude “new money,”
families with children, Republicans, African Americans, or residents who lack fashion
sense from particular residential communities.7 And some people appear willing to pay a
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Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

2

See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973); Rosemarie Maldonado &
Robert D. Rose, The Application of Civil Rights Laws to Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-ops Bastions of
Discriminatory Exclusion or Self-Selecting Models of Community-Based Living?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
1245 (1996).
3

See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 3604, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3604); New Jersey Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27 D301-329 (West 2004).
4

See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 60-78 (1994); David M. Cutler et al., The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto,
107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 477 (1999); Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in the Segregation of
Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society, 59 AM. SOC. REV.
23, 28 (1994).
5

See, e.g., Senior Civil Liberties Ass’n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1992); MCKENZIE, supra
note 4, at 57.
6

See, e.g., Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v. Silver, 140 Cal.App.3d 964 (Ct. App. 1983).
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substantial premium for this privilege.8 Whatever the law says about the legality of
certain kinds of exclusion, individual preferences for exclusion will persist to varying
degrees.9
People interested in residential homogeneity inevitably will try to thwart
integration using creative substitutes for overt discrimination. This essay explores one
such response, which is essentially unregulated by antidiscrimination laws. The essay
then examines the pros and cons of inclusionary government remedies. Perhaps
counterintuitively, the primary exclusionary device I have in mind are various types of
club goods, although local public goods can further the same purpose too.
Club goods are somewhat rivalrous resources from which outsiders can be
excluded,10 for which “the optimal sharing group is more than one person or family but
smaller than an infinitely large number.”11 Residential elevators, concierges, and tennis
courts are classic examples of club goods, in that few individuals or nuclear families find
it worth their while to include such resources in their living quarters, but these resources
can become quite attractive when their costs and benefits can be divided among multiple
households.12 If too few people are using the elevator, concierge, or tennis court, then it
will go to waste, and those who must pay for a share of the resource will be overtaxed by
their condominium or homeowners’ associations. If, on the other hand, too many people
try to use the resource in question, it will become too crowded and provide insufficient
value to members of the club. Access to club goods is, in large measure, what makes
residence in a common interest community attractive to so many families.
7

See, e.g. Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Processes of Racial Residential Segregation, in URBAN INEQUALITY:
EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 217, 259 tbl. 4.6 (Alice O’Connor ed. 2001) (noting that 11% of whites
responded in a survey that they wanted to live in neighborhoods that were 100% white, and that 2.5% of
black respondents said they wanted to live in all-black neighborhoods); see also Michael O. Emerson et al.,
Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans?, 66 AM.
SOC. REV. 922, 927-32 (2001) (finding that the presence of Asian Americans and Latinos had little effect
on whites’ willingness to move into a neighborhood once crime, public school quality, and anticipated
appreciation of real estate were controlled, but that the presence of African Americans had a very
substantial effect on whites’ willingness to move into the neighborhood, even after controlling for these
variables); Abby Goodnough, Salsa Dancers and Stunt Men? Must Be a Miami Condo Project, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2005, at A1 (discussing the over-the-top efforts of condominium developers to attract
“image conscious people, many from Latin America and Europe” with lavish sales parties designed to
“emulate the club scene,” including one party at a “sports-inspired” condominium with “trampoline artists,
karate demonstrations, masseuses, and aura reader, an oxygen bar, and sales agents in tracksuits”).
8

Patrick Bayer et al., Residential Segregation in General Equilibrium, Yale University Working Paper
(Oct. 2003); Bayer et al., Equilibrium Model; Cutler & Glaeser; Stephen L. Ross, Segregation and Racial
Preferences: An Analysis of Choice Based on Satisfaction and Outcome Measures 2 (Univ. of Conn. Dept.
of Econ. Working Paper 2003).
9

See Joe R. Feagin, Excluding Blacks and Others from Housing: The Foundation of White Racism, 4
CITYSCAPE: J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH 79, 81-88 (1999).
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Todd Sandler & John Tschirhart, Club Theory: Thirty Years Later, 93 PUB. CHOICE 335 (1997). The
leading academic treatment of club goods is RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 347-480 (2d ed. 1996).
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James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 2, 13 (1965).
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Robert D. Tollison, Consumption Sharing and Non-Exclusion Rules, 39 ECONOMICA 276, 287 (1972).
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The exclusionary amenities strategy begins with a simple first step: A developer
of a common interest community can embed particularly costly club goods within the
residential development and then record covenants and declarations that require all
present and future members of the community to contribute toward their maintenance on
the basis of some criteria other than use. The willingness to pay for these goods will
function as a sorting mechanism for would-be residents. People who are likely to use the
club good will purchase homes in the common interest community, and those who are
unlikely to use the club good in question will be deterred from joining the community.
So far, there is nothing insidious about this process. Those who like to swim will
gravitate toward condo developments with nice pools, and those who like to play softball
may join homeowners’ associations that invest in attractive softball diamonds. This
seems perfectly natural, and welfare enhancing, as Charles Tiebout argued long ago.13
Such self-sorting increases homogeneity within residential communities, but
heterogeneous preferences with respect to sporting activities do not seem like something
the law should combat, at least not at first glance.
The worrisome part of this story arises in the following circumstance. What if a
developer selects a particular club good, not because the members of an association will
actually derive substantial value from its use, but because the club good in question
deters members of “undesirable” groups from joining the community in question?14 In
13

Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL ECON. 416 (1956). Tiebout
argued that residents’ decisions to move to, or stay in, particular communities revealed their preferences for
various packages of public goods and taxes. Where residential mobility is relatively unconstrained, and
there are many communities from which to choose, each individual could be expected to flock to “that
community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.” Id. at 418. If there are many such
communities within a geographic area, then the immigration and emigration of residents will mimic the
buying and selling that disciplines the market. As a result, Tiebout argued that an efficient market could
emerge in the provision of municipal services. Id. at 423-24; see also Robert W. Helsley & William C.
Strange, Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs, 24 CANADIAN J. OF ECON. 888, 897 (1991) (arguing that the
provision of club goods also will be Pareto efficient if excluding outsiders is costly).
For further development of Tiebout’s ideas within the legal literature, see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 473 (1991); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997); Lee Anne
Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (2001); Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185 (1996); and
Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481 (2004). For criticisms of the Tiebout theory, see
Truman F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMICA 713
(1981).
14

Teibout, in a footnote, speculated that individuals might desire to live near “nice” neighbors, but he did
not pursue the implications of this idea for his theory. Tiebout, supra note 13, at 418 n.12. In the 1970s,
Allan De Serpa modeled the idea that individuals may derive utility or disutility based on the extent to
which their fellow club members have particular characteristics. See Allan C. De Serpa, A Theory of
Discriminatory Clubs, 24 SCOTTISH J. OF POL. ECON. 33, 34 (1977); see also Sandler & Tschirhart, supra
note 10, at 344 (“Once heterogeneity is allowed in clubs, sharing arrangement can account for members
consuming both the shared good and the characteristics or attributes of other members.”). De Serpa did not
develop a model of exclusionary club goods or anything like it. Rather, his major contribution consisted of
noting the possibility that these preferences for particular kinds of club memberships would affect the
Pareto optimum level of club goods provision. Id. at 39. Lee Fennell has also argued that individuals will
care substantially about the nature of the people with whom they share local public goods, and that
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this case, potential members may join the club, and happily pay for the club good,
knowing that by purchasing this club good they are simultaneously receiving the
“benefits” of exclusion without violating anti-discrimination laws. Whereas Tiebout
envisioned municipalities competing for residents by providing them the goods, services,
and tax packages that they valued most, we can now imagine a world in which
homeowners associations (and perhaps municipalities) compete for the residents that they
want by providing them with the goods, services, and assessment packages that are least
palatable to undesired potential residents. Such associations thereby select common
amenities, not only on the basis of what amenities are inherently welfare enhancing, but
also on the basis of how effectively those amenities promote self-selection by would-be
residents. The most valuable club goods for these purposes are the ones that send the
clearest messages to desirable and undesirable prospective purchasers.
There will be two mechanisms that enable exclusionary amenities to promote
residential segregation. The first relates to sorting15 and the second relates to focal
points.16 The sorting point can be explained succinctly. To the extent that a taste for a
common amenity, x, functions as a proxy for some characteristic, y, then sorting on the
basis of willingness to pay for x will produce, as a predictable side effect, sorting on the
basis of y as well. Mandating that all residents of a neighborhood pay for amenity x will
function as a tax that falls disproportionately on populations that do not possess
characteristic y.
The focal points connection is more complex. The idea here is that consumers
will understand the sorting properties of exclusionary amenities and that those who want
to live in a community with lots of people who possess characteristic y will purchase
homes in communities that provide amenity x. By the same token, consumers who do not
want to live among those who overwhelmingly possess characteristic y will be deterred
from purchasing a home in a subdivision that offers amenity x. Amenity x therefore
functions as a focal point around which consumers who care about the presence or
absence of characteristic y can organize themselves. The kicker, of course, is that
characteristic y may be a racial, religious, or other suspect classification. If the public
understands the correlation between amenity x and characteristic y, then by advertising
the presence of amenity x real estate developers may undermine the efficacy of laws that
prohibit discriminatory advertising in the real estate market.
American anti-discrimination laws have gone to great lengths in recent years to
obscure the racial composition of newly planned developments from prospective
purchasers.17 If few residents have moved into a new neighborhood, it may be quite
neighbors who enhance the quality of such goods (e.g., smart students, or neighborhood watch members)
will have incentives to coalesce into communities that exclude less cooperative members. Fennell, supra
note 13, at 26-29.
15

For prior discussions of sorting in the residential context, see Tiebout, supra note 13, at 416, and Lee
Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1454-1457 (2005).

16

For more on focal points generally, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57-71
(1980); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000);
Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 ECON. J. 533 (1995).
17

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); Martin D. Abravanel, Public Knowledge of Fair Housing Law: Does
It Protect Against Housing Discrimination?, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 469, 480 (2002) (noting

4

difficult for prospective purchasers to obtain accurate information about their fellow
prospective purchasers through simple observation. And to the extent that many initial
buyers will be real estate speculators, as opposed to owner occupiers, the developer
himself may lack information about the planned development’s initial racial
composition.18 Yet such information matters greatly to many purchasers, who fear
buying into a new development with a racial composition that is not to their liking,
particularly given the tendency for neighborhood composition to change rapidly in the
manner predicted by Tom Schelling’s “tipping” models.19
Caucasians who purchase homes in a new development that winds up tipping
toward African American composition will incur substantial economic costs as a result.20
widespread public knowledge of the Fair Housing Act’s provisions prohibiting racially discriminatory
advertising and steering); Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary L. Fischer, Fair Housing Testing – Uncovering
Discriminatory Practices, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1127 (1995) (describing federal efforts to enforce Fair
Housing laws using government officials posing as would be purchasers or renters); Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, (1995) (“Under the Fair Housing Act, it is illegal for
a real estate broker to indicate, whether asked or not, what the racial makeup of a community is when a
buyer is purchasing residential property. Nor can a broker indicate the racial patterns of purchasing and
selling in a neighborhood.”); Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics and RaceBased Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1180-81 (1998) (noting how anti-blockbusting
statutes also constrain real estate agents’ ability to discuss anticipated changes in neighborhood racial
composition). Despite these efforts, steering and other forms of housing discrimination persist. See
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS 104-05 (1993); Jan Ondrich et al., Do Real Estate Brokers Choose to Discriminate?
Evidence from the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study, 64 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 880, 889-90 (1998).
18

See Patrice Hill, Region Joins Housing Bubble: Overvalued Homes a Worry, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2005, at A1 (noting the abundance of speculators in Washington, D.C.); Ted Pincus, Area Real Estate
Market Keeps on Rolling Along, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at 61 (noting the same in Chicago); Linda
Rawls, South Florida Condominium Market May Be Headed for Meltdown, Analysts Warn, PALM BEACH
POST, Aug. 6, 2004 (noting that up to 70% of South Florida condominium buyers are speculators who do
not intend to occupy the units).
19

Ondrich et al., supra note 17, at 891. Tom Schelling’s work on neighborhood “tipping” suggests the
bleak possibility that complete residential segregation is inevitable if both Caucasians and African
Americans prefer to live in diverse neighborhoods where they are part of the majority group. See Thomas
Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 143 (1971). Schelling’s approach
has been the subject of some recent criticism on both theoretical and empirical grounds. See, e.g., Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchamovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965 (2000); William Easterly,
The Racial Tipping Point in American Neighborhoods: Unstable Equilibrium or Urban Legend (N.Y.U.
Working Paper June 2003); but cf. W.A.V. Clark, Residential Preferences and Neighborhood Racial
Segregation: A Test of the Schelling Segregation Model, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 1 (1991) (concluding that
Schelling’s account is more right than wrong). One problem with the strong version of Schelling’s
hypothesis is that precise neighborhood-level or block-level racial composition data is hard to obtain,
largely because of governmental efforts to combat residential segregation. Schelling seems to assume that
residents have, or at some point obtain, perfect information about the racial composition of their
neighborhoods. The strong version of his model also deemphasizes factors such as loss aversion,
stubbornness, preferences among some citizens for substantial diversity, and the transaction costs
associated with real estate transactions. All these considerations help explain why many neighborhoods in
the United States achieve a stable equilibrium at some point besides complete racial homogeneity.
20

Property values appreciate much less quickly in largely African American neighborhoods than in largely
Caucasian neighborhoods. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in
Wealth and Asset Composition, 105 Q. J. ECON. 321, 333 (1990); David Rusk, The Segregation Tax: The
Cost of Racial Segregation to Black Homeowners, BROOKING INSTITUTE SURVEY, October 2001, at 5.
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Real estate has historically appreciated much more quickly in all-white neighborhoods
than in neighborhoods that have a ten percent African American population, and
noticeably more quickly in ten percent African American neighborhoods than twenty
percent African American neighborhoods.21 Relatively minor changes in the racial
composition of a neighborhood thus can have enormous consequences for a homeowning family’s net worth and may cause families to change residences more frequently
than they would prefer. Accordingly, prospective buyers will purchase under tremendous
uncertainty, softening the demand for residences in new developments where the likely
racial composition is as yet unknown.22
In this situation, we can expect substantial pent up demand for information about
a new development’s likely racial composition. Exclusionary club goods function as a
mechanism for reducing the uncertainty and transition costs associated with residential
tipping. Exclusionary club goods address this uncertainty by communicating to African
American and Caucasian purchasers which direction the development is likely to tip. By
promoting the sorting of successive purchasers, exclusionary club goods may also
provide a permanent bulwark against “reverse tipping” that might result from blockbusting activities organized by real estate agents or community groups.23 This analysis
suggests that exclusionary club goods may be quite valuable in new residential
developments precisely because they make the tipping process far more efficient.
Exclusionary club goods serve a different function in established developments. There,
they function as social goods that cause many neighborhood residents to congregate in
particular places, which dramatically lowers the information costs associated with
subsequent prospective purchasers’ efforts to discern a neighborhood’s racial
composition.
Let me make the exclusionary amenities scenario concrete with a hypothetical.
Say a developer wants to create a residential community within a heterogeneous
metropolitan area, where whites and blacks have similar income levels, and each racial
group comprises 50% of the population. Suppose the developer knows that the only
salient difference between blacks and whites is that 80% of whites play polo, whereas
only 20% of blacks play polo. Finally, suppose, consistent with empirical data, that there
is substantial market demand for housing developments that are relatively racially
homogenous.24 The sophisticated developer might build his residential development
21

Sunwoong Kim, Race and Home Price Appreciation in Urban Neighborhoods: Evidence from
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 9, 25-26 & ex. 7 (Fall 2000).
22

Housing in developments that were planned after the enactment of the 1968 Fair Housing Act is less
racially segregated than housing in older neighborhoods, where lawful, overt discrimination helped
entrench a racially segregated housing equilibrium. See Joe T. Darden & Sameh M. Kamel, Black
Residential Segregation in Suburban Detroit: Empirical Testing of the Ecological Theory, REV. OF BLACK
POL. ECON. 103, 106 (Winter 2000); Farley & Frey, supra note 4, at 28, 36-37.
23

Block busting occurs when real estate agents intentionally promote rapid racial tipping in a neighborhood
as a means of obtaining sizable commissions on home sales. For more on block busting, see ARNOLD R.
HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE & HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 31-36 (1998);
McKenzie, supra note 4, at 72; Drew S. Days, III, Rethinking the Integrative Ideal: Housing, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 459, 465 (2002); and Mehlhorn, supra note 17, at 1145
24

For a comprehensive review of the literature on preferences for residential segregation, see Casey J.
Dawkins, Recent Evidence on the Continuing Causes of Black-White Residential Segregation, 26 J. URBAN
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around a polo grounds, and require that all those who purchase homes in the vicinity pay
annual assessments to support the upkeep, staffing, and real estate taxes associated with
the polo grounds and their affiliated stables.
At base, we might expect that the resulting population of homeowners will be
80% white and 20% black, because non-polo players will decide to spend their real estate
dollars elsewhere. Embedding a polo grounds within a residential community will
function in a manner similar to charging a racially disproportionate tax on purchases
within the subdivision, whereby blacks are charged more for homes than whites. But this
sorting mechanism will be supplemented by a focal points effect. To the extent that some
Caucasian home purchasers have a preference for living in a predominantly white
community, we will expect that the population of our development may become even
more skewed. After all, the community in question will attract not only those who have a
strong interest in polo, but those who have a strong interest in white residential
homogeneity. This latter group is not paying a premium for the polo grounds and stables
per se. Rather, it is paying a premium for the perceived benefits of racial exclusion.25
Ideally, this group might prefer to live in a community that practiced overt racial
discrimination,26 but because the law thwarts such discrimination, this polo grounds
development represents the next “best” alternative. While anti-discrimination laws
prevent the developer from advertising in a way that provide prospective purchasers with
information about the likely racial composition of the new neighborhood, the presence of
a polo ground will communicate such a message to attentive prospective residents.
In the real world, gated communities built around polo grounds are rare, though
Forbes has identified a few of them.27 But those built around golf courses are common,
and during the 1990s golf had precisely the polarizing attributes that my hypothetical
ascribed to polo. In the pages that follow, I will explore the possibility that residential
AFF. 379 (2004). A less comprehensive literature review, albeit one with a greater emphasis on work by
legal scholars, appears in A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences,
103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2005).
25

There may be some African Americans who will pay a large premium to live in overwhelmingly
Caucasian neighborhoods, but evidently these African Americans do not exist in large numbers. See
Charles, supra note 7, at 259 tbl. 4.6; Dawkins, supra note 24, at 387-92. Moreover, African Americans
are unlikely to move into neighborhoods that are believed to contain a large percentage of residents who do
not want African American neighbors. See Charles, supra note 7, at 230-31. Note further that virtually all
white respondents to a telephone survey stated that they were unwilling to move into a neighborhood in
which African Americans comprised 65% or more of the residents, even though pollsters informed the
white respondents that crime in the neighborhood was low, school quality was high, and housing values
were increasing. Emerson et al., supra note 7, at 930.

26

Or it might not. Overt discrimination may be socially costly in a way that discrimination-by-amenities is
not. Perhaps this results from the ambiguous social meaning of exclusionary club goods strategies or the
law’s decision to sanction one form of discrimination but not the other. Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts,
Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1432 (1994) (noting the expressive harms
engendered by visible homeowners’ association actions that would conflict with antidiscrimination laws if
undertaken with state involvement).
27

See Sarah Clemence, Most Expensive Gated Communities in America 2004, Forbes.com, available in <
http://www.forbes.com/2004/11/19/cx_sc_1119home.html> (“One on our list of the most expensive in the
country has security patrols on the water to keep watch on multi-million-dollar yachts. Others have polo
grounds and picnics with all the right people.)”
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golf communities have functioned as exclusionary club goods. At the same time, I also
will point to instances in which the exclusionary amenities strategy might contribute to
acceptable, or perhaps even laudable, types of residential sorting.
This essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly examines the possibility of
exclusion premiums. Residential settings that provide members with opportunities to
discriminate among those who can afford to join the community command a market
premium, particularly at the high end of the real estate market. Part II develops the idea
of the exclusionary club good and exclusionary public good (collectively, “exclusionary
amenities”) and points out the possibilities for using these amenities to exclude groups
from developments where anti-discrimination law proscribes more “efficient” forms of
exclusion. It examines some tentative empirical evidence on exclusionary amenities,
focusing on residential golf course developments. Part III introduces the idea of
“inclusionary amenities” and examines the possibility that a developer’s decision to
forego such resources in a common interest community might provide additional
opportunities to exclude undesirables, albeit by depriving the community’s members of
resources whose provision they would otherwise find welfare-enhancing. Part IV
examines possible legal responses to the introduction of exclusionary amenities or the
absence of inclusionary amenities in residential communities. Part V provides a brief
conclusion.
I.

The Exclusion Premium

A recent paper by Michael Schill, Ion Voicu & Jonathan Miller identified an
interesting puzzle in the Manhattan real estate market.28 As a general matter, apartments
in condominiums attract a premium over similar apartments in housing cooperatives.
Controlling for the many variables that differentiate housing units, Schill and his
coauthors found that, as a general matter, a condominium apartment commands a 15.5%
premium over a similarly situated cooperative.29 This finding was consistent with what
Manhattan real estate agents expected.30
Why this discrepancy between condominiums and cooperatives? On this point,
Schill and his co-authors identify several respects in which the condominium structure is
more efficient and more desirable than the cooperative structure. They summarized the
most important benefits of the condominium structure in this manner:
Unlike the case of cooperative apartments, condominium owners do not
effectively share liability on mortgage debt, they are free to transfer their
apartments to whomever they choose, they are subject to fewer rules than

28

Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium v. Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in
New York City (2004), available in <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=502362>.
29

Id. at 30.

30

Id. at 5, 11.
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cooperative apartment owners and, correspondingly, they need spend less
time in internal governance.31
On this account, Manhattan sounds like a real estate market that works perfectly. The
efficient ownership regime confers value on owners, and the inefficient regime confers
losses on owners who adhere to it.32 New buildings in Manhattan overwhelmingly
structure themselves as condominiums, not cooperatives,33 but the high costs of
transitioning from the cooperative to the condominium form explain why there are still
many cooperative buildings in New York.34
Strikingly, however, Schill and his co-authors identified a group of apartments in
which the ordinary patterns were reversed. For these apartments, the cooperative form
actually conferred a very substantial premium – 20.7 percent – on owners.35 The
distinguishing characteristic of cooperative units that command a premium is that they
bar financing as part of the purchase of a unit. These units, in short, are in buildings
where the owners can afford to buy homes without any need for a mortgage. Prohibitions
on mortgage financing arise in both condominium and cooperative buildings, but it is the
cooperative apartment buildings that command a hefty premium as the domain of
Manhattan’s economic elites.
Let us be quite clear about what this data means. Wealthy owners of Manhattan
cooperative apartments seem willing to pay a hefty premium and sacrifice substantial
leisure time and a great deal of financial privacy at the time of purchase, all for the
benefits of exclusivity and having a much greater say in who their neighbors are.36 For
money-is-no-object types, the leisure time premium paid by cooperative owners may be
even more substantial than the economic premium. Cooperatives’ authority to exclude
has been exercised to keep the likes of Madonna and Richard Nixon out of prestigious
New York buildings,37 but there is also some evidence suggesting that it has been used to
31

Id.

32

See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies,
and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25 (1991).

33

Schill et al., supra note 28, at 5.

34

Id. at 32-33. Schill et al. identify substantial transaction costs and adverse tax consequences associated
with transitioning a cooperative building into a condominium. During the last three decades, the
percentage of common interest communities that have used the cooperative form has plummeted. Evan
McKenzie, Common-Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow, 14 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 203,
207 tbl. 2 (2003).
35

Schill et al., supra note 28, at 30.

36

Id. at 10. See also id. at 31 (“The reasons for this rather large relative shift from a sizable condominium
premium to a discount are not absolutely clear. One explanation may be that for a relatively small segment
of cooperative apartment owners, the cooperative form is value maximizing because of the power it gives
to owners to maintain exclusivity. A large proportion (79.3 percent) of the apartment sales in buildings
with rules prohibiting financing were also in the top decline of cooperative apartment values. This suggests
that affluent New Yorkers may be using the ‘no financing’ restriction to maintain an affluent living
environment and that the benefits of social exclusiveness, themselves, generate value for these
purchasers.”). Condominium owners have far less discretion to prevent sales to particular buyers than do
cooperative owners.
37

Id. at 10 n.8.
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exclude members of historically marginalized groups.38 Perhaps as a result, the New
York courts have begun policing decisions to exclude members of protected groups from
cooperative apartments more closely in recent years.39
This data suggests something else that is equally important. Before the advent of
antidiscrimination laws and doctrines, restrictions on alienation and club membership
could keep “undesirables” out of certain communities. But once the state began
enforcing antidiscrimination laws, people who wished to exclude these undesirables had
to do so on the basis of proxies.40 Wealth and income often provide important proxies,
and suburbs in particular managed to maintain substantial exclusivity by restricting
neighborhoods to single family homes built on large lots.41 But the Manhattan coops
show that price will sometimes be an inadequate exclusionary proxy. People may want
to exclude “new money” or “old money” or members of a particular political party from
their communities, and will seek out some mechanism for doing so. This helps explain
the cooperative premium at the high end. In recent decades, income and wealth have
become poorer proxies for race and other characteristics that have often formed the basis
for exclusion.42 Once wealth and income become less useful proxies, people interested in
screening their neighbors may have to turn to other characteristics.
II.

“If You Build It, They Won’t Come”: An Introduction to
Exclusionary Amenities

On the basis of the Schill et al. study, and similar studies,43 it seems appropriate to
assume a market demand for exclusion in the residential setting, and particularly strong
market demand for exclusion at the highest income levels. Some other studies suggest
that, as incomes rise, the demand for racially homogeneous neighborhoods actually
increases.44 Residential exclusion, in that sense, may be something of a luxury good.
38

See Maldonado & Rose, supra note 2, at 1245; Sabrina Malpeli, Comment, Cracking Down on
Cooperative Board Decisions that Reject Applicants Based on Race: Broom v. Biondi,73 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 313 (1999).
39

Id.

40

See generally WILLIAM J. COLLINS, THE HOUSING MARKET IMPACT OF STATE-LEVEL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 1960-1970 (Feb. 2003) (examining the effects of anti-discrimination law
enforcement on the housing market).
41

J. Peter Byrne, Book Review, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265, 2266-72 (1997);
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1841, 1894-1906 (1994).
42
43

See infra note 84.
See supra note 24 and sources cited therein.

44

See, e.g., Patrick Bayer et al., An Equilibrium Model of Sorting in an Urban Housing Market: The
Causes and Consequences of Residential Segregation, YALE ECON. GROWTH CTR. DISCUSSION PAPER NO.
860 (July 2003). This trend is evidently more pronounced for Caucasians than for African Americans. See
Richard D. Alba et al., How Segregated Are Middle-Class African Americans?, 47 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 543
(2000); Dawkins, supra note 24, at 382-83.
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This conclusion coincides with a standard assumption in the club goods literature that
club members derive utility from having fellow members with desired characteristics and
disutility from having fellow members with undesirable characteristics.45 As soon as that
assumption is made, and the law attempts to restrict certain types of exclusion that are
demanded by some consumers, exclusionary amenities become inevitable.
A.

Understanding Exclusionary Club Goods

I define an “exclusionary club good” 46 as a collective good that is paid for by all
members of a club, at least in part because willingness to pay for the good in question
functions as an effective proxy for other desired membership characteristics. In the
residential setting, exclusionary club goods function to engender homogeneity among
neighborhood residents with respect to any particular characteristic, and prevent the
neighborhood’s population from reflecting the heterogeneity that exists in the larger
community with respect to that characteristic. As with other forms of club goods,
exclusionary club goods are somewhat rivalrous and excludable. Demand for exclusivity
45

See, e.g., De Serpa, supra note 14, at 34; Sandler & Tschirhart, supra note 10, at 344 (“Once
heterogeneity is allowed in clubs, sharing arrangement can account for members consuming both the shared
good and the characteristics or attributes of other members. Members’ characteristics may be viewed by
other members as generating an increase (e.g., intelligence in a learned society) or a decrease (e.g.,
rudeness) in utility.”); Suzanne Scotchmer, On Price-Taking Equilibria in Club Economies with
Nonanonymous Crowding, 65 J. PUB. ECON. 75, 75-76 (1997); see also Fernando Jaramillo & Fabien
Moizeau, Conspicuous Consumption and Social Segmentation, 5 J. OF PUBLIC ECON. THEORY 1, 2 (2003)
(“The reason agents are interested in joining social groups is that these groups may serve to allocate goods
or services not traded on markets. Exchanging friendship, communicating information about job search
and business opportunities, providing mutual aid or insurance constitute many examples of these forms of
allocation.”).
Mine is not the first paper to hypothesize that strategic behavior occurs in the club goods setting.
Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf, and Fabien Moizeau have speculated briefly that individuals may
engage in wasteful conspicuous consumption as a means of signaling wealth to potential clubs, who would
invite these consumers to join their high-status clubs based on a belief that a willingness to engage in
conspicuous consumption indicates a willingness to contribute to club goods. Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert
Kempf, and Fabien Moizeau, Conspicuous Consumption, Social Status and Clubs (Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei Working Paper 2000); see also id. at 18 (“[W]e could see the signaling problem in a very different
way: the observable item could be the individual contribution to the club, on which is based society’s
inference over individual income and therefore on social status. In other words you contribute to the New
York Yacht Club not because you like sailing but for snobbish reasons only: just to show off your fortune.
It is then social segmentation into clubs which serves as the support of status discrimination or social
segmentation into statutses.”).
46

A quick note on terminology. My use of “exclusionary” to describe the club goods in question does not
indicate that the exclusion mechanism has anything to do with trespass law (the body of property law that
protects the right to exclude most directly). Rather, exclusionary club goods are exclusionary in the same
way that “exclusionary zoning” is exclusionary – the end result of either strategy will be a community in
which the citizens targeted for exclusion are poorly represented. Similarly, I refer to “inclusionary club
goods” later in the paper. These club goods are inclusionary in the same way that “inclusionary zoning” is.
Inclusionary zoning typically encompasses strategies designed to make a community more attractive to
lower-income residents. For further discussion of exclusionary and inclusionary zoning, see PETER H.
SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 203-227 (2003); David J.
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2357-61 (2003); Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony
of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
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helps fuel demand for an exclusionary club good, along with inherent demand for the
club good itself. Although not all “club goods” entail social interactions among fellow
users, exclusionary club goods often do, for reasons that will be explained shortly.47
In order to function as an effective sorting device, an exclusionary club good must
be both relatively expensive and relatively visible. If the club good in question is too
cheap, then the decision to join a particular community might not be affected
substantially by its presence. A “cheap” club good may engender heterogeneity through
the operation of focal points, but it will not have any sorting effects. If, on the other
hand, the club good is relatively expensive, such that an “undesirable” residential
purchaser will conceptualize it as a high differential tax without any associated benefit,
then it may convince the undesirable purchaser to buy a home in a community that does
not provide the club good in question. Similarly, a club good that is invisible or that does
not predictably attract purchasers with particular characteristics will not operate as an
effective focal point.48 Homogeneity will result from sorting and focal point mechanisms
acting in concert.
To consumers about to make the most important investments of their lifetimes,
the synergy between sorting and focal points may prove critical, and this may explain the
preference for an expensive club good over a cheap focal point alone. To the extent that
focal point messages are misinterpreted, see their meaning change over time, or reach an
audience without particularly widespread preferences for homogeneity, the presence of
an expensive sorting device will be a critical guarantee that a homogenous population
will arise in the first instance and be maintained through multiple generations of buyers.49
Where a form of exclusion is sanctioned by neither the law nor prevalent social
norms, one should not expect to find any exclusionary club goods. For example,
residential communities in the United States are permitted by law to discriminate against
convicted sex offenders who present high risks of recidivism.50 Citizens may,
understandably, have a strong preference for excluding such individuals from their
neighborhoods,51 but the legality of overt discrimination renders it inefficient for a
community to invest in exclusionary amenities that would be attractive to non-sex
47

See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.

48

A large body of real estate law mandates that sellers disclose various attributes of their property to
potential purchasers. As the analysis above suggests, various forms of mandatory disclosure may have the
unintended consequence of promoting residential homogeneity.

49

The implicit assumption here is that preferences for certain types of common amenities are more stable
over time than linguistic signals, which are the cheapest tools in a focal point strategy, but might see their
meanings change radically, thanks to linguistic reclamation, government actions, or other behavioral shifts.
For a discussion of efforts to shift the social meaning of particular communications, see Lessig, supra note
17, at 1010-13, 1041-42.

50

Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Assn, 766 A.2d 1186 (Sup. Ct. 2001); People v. Leroy, __
N.E.2d __, 2005 WL 880969, (Ill. Ct. App., April 12, 2005).
51

See, e.g., David Herbest, Neighbors Pressure Sex Offender to Move, MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE, Sep. 10,
2004 (describing the decline in property values and neighborhood opposition that occurred after one sex
offender moved into a common interest community), available in <http://www.mvvoice/com/morgue/2004/2004_09_10.chavez.shtml>.
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offenders, but unattractive to sex offenders.52 Instead, communities use covenants or
even local ordinances to exclude sex offenders.53 Similarly, when a developer seeks to
fill a market niche by creating a common interest community devoted to housing
members of a politically disfavored group, employing exclusionary amenities would be
overkill. Rather, the cheaper alternative of a focal point alone should suffice to establish
residential homogeneity within the common interest community. Thus, the Palms of
Manasota, the nation’s first retirement community for homosexuals, need not invest in
exclusionary amenities to keep heterosexual retirees from residing there.54 Anti-gay
sentiment alone is sufficiently powerful among straight seniors to prevent integration.
When club members or real estate developers have a preference for excluding
members of protected classes, the options available shrink. For example, African
Americans and members of all other racial groups are protected by various laws designed
to combat discrimination in the housing sector.55 Such laws reach not only refusals to
sell or lease, but also limit the ability of landlords or sellers to advertise in a racially
discriminatory manner.56 This body of law substantially constrains a developer’s choice
of human models in housing advertisements by imposing liability on landlords whose
advertisements feature exclusively Caucasian models.57 Indeed, in some respects,
housing advertising is more tightly regulated than the sale or leasing of housing. For
example, anti-discrimination laws permit “mom and pop” landlords to refuse to lease
certain apartments to tenants on the basis of race, but bar those same landlords from
advertising their discriminatory preferences with respect to said apartment.58 Deprived of
“efficient”59 tools of discrimination, such as racist refusals to deal or advertisements,
52

It is not difficult to imagine a club good that might provide a good proxy for sex offender’s status.
Community members might make extremely heavy investments in school child-abuse-awareness programs
or domestic violence police, as a way of discouraging dangerous sex offenders from settling in a particular
community.

53

Betsy Blaney, Safe at Home: Lubbock Company Creating Sex Offender-Free Subdivision, FT. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, June 7, 2005, at B5; Stephanie Simon, Ex-Cons Exiled to Outskirts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2002, at 1.
54

Debra Rosenberg, A Place of Their Own, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 2001, at 54.

55

See supra note 3.

56

Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 335 (2003); Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and §3604(C): A New
Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187 (2001).
57

Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).

58

Petty et al., supra note 56, at 376.

59

There may be a few senses in which exclusionary club goods strategies are more efficient than overt
discrimination in admission or advertising. First, adopting the exclusionary club goods strategy may be
less “in your face,” or confrontational, than excluding members of undesired groups, and excluders may
value this opportunity. See supra note 26; cf. De Serpa, supra note 14, at 39 (“[P]eople are apt to be
reluctant to admit, face to face, that the characteristics of others are repulsive to them. As a consequence,
the exclusion of individuals exhibiting certain characteristics evolves as a second best solution.”). Second,
club members may actually want to attract members of disfavored groups who actually loathe other
members of their disfavored groups. To maximize this preference, overt discrimination will be ineffective,
but exclusionary club goods may be highly effective.
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those with a preference for discrimination may explore less “efficient” strategies that the
law does not proscribe.60 Exclusionary amenities may become a viable option under such
circumstances.
B.

Comparing Private Goods

To be sure, self-sorting occurs in many contexts.61 Developers might distort the
population of a new housing development by providing larger-than-average kitchens
(attracting gourmets) or miniscule kitchens (attracting those who prefer to eat at
restaurants). That said, there are two critical difference between self-selection through
these private goods and self-selection through club goods.
The first distinction is sociological. Club goods often involve social interactions
among the members who are entitled to use them.62 Private goods, by contrast, typically

60

Formally, the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Fair Housing Act Amendments (FHAA) recognize
disparate impact claims. See Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Township of Scotch
Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466-67 (3d Cir. 2002); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304-07 (9th Cir.
1997). That said, FHA and FHAA are almost always brought against local governments, as opposed to
individual developers, perhaps because it is so easy for a developer to rebut a prima facie case of disparate
impact by pointing to a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action,” such as consumer demand,
unconnected to exclusionary motives, for the club good in question. Lapid-Laurel, supra, at 467; Gamble,
supra at 305.
The leading FHA disparate impact case involving a non-governmental defendant is Hack v.
President and Fellows of Yale College, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000). In Hack, the plaintiffs alleged that
Yale’s requirement that freshmen and sophomores live in co-educational dormitories had a disparate impact
on unmarried Orthodox Jews whose religious convictions barred them from residing in co-ed
environments. Id. at 88. The plaintiffs complained that they were compelled to pay for dormitory rooms
that they did not and would not use. Id. The panel majority held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
under the FHA because they did not allege “that Yale’s policy has resulted in or predictably will result in
under-representation of Orthodox Jews in Yale housing.” Id. at 91. The majority therefore determined that
the plaintiffs failed to state a prima facie case under the FHA. Even if they had shown a disparate impact,
however, the majority probably would have ruled in Yale’s favor, finding that Yale’s interest in promoting
gender-integration was non-discriminatory and reasonable. A dissenting judge would have held that the
plaintiffs could pursue a discriminatory impact claim under the FHA’s prohibition on religious
discrimination. See id. at 104 (Moran, J., dissenting). Although the plaintiffs did not frame their argument
as such, an exclusionary club goods story implicitly underpinned their discrimination claim.
61

Self-sorting has been studied in the employment context, where employers may offer particular benefits
as a means of preventing undesirable types from joining a firm in instances where employees have
asymmetric information. See, e.g., Peter C. Coyte, Specific Human Capital and Sorting Mechanisms in
Labor Markets, 51 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 469 (1984). For a recent application of this idea to the legal
literature on executive compensation, see James Spindler & Todd Henderson, Corporate Heroin: A
Defense of Perks, GEORGETOWN L.J. ( forthcoming 2005).
62

Marilyn Gardner, An Empty Nest – Now What?, Once the Kids Move Out, Couples Start to Ask
Themselves What They Want in Life and How Much Space They Need, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., April 21,
2001, at 15; see also Ronald T. Mitchelson & Michael T. Lazaro, The Face of the Game: African
Americans’ Spatial Accessibility to Golf, 44 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 48, 70 (2004) (“The golf course
can be a wonderful landscape of intense social and environmental interaction.”).
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involve more limited social interactions.63 In a neighborhood comprised entirely of quiet
shut-ins living in single family homes, homeowners probably will not care that much
about the characteristics of their neighbors.64 As interactions among neighbors increase,
we can expect that homeowners will care more about the characteristics of their
neighbors. Club goods often become a locus of social activity within common interest
communities, offering additional dimensions in which interactions can occur. For that
reason, one might expect that people will pay a greater premium for desirable neighbors
in a community offering many club goods than they would for desirable neighbors in a
community offering no club goods.65 One reason why racial segregation is a public
policy problem stems from the connection between residential propinquity and the
composition of individuals’ social networks.66 Residential segregation helps explain the
segregated nature of social interactions in public schools, political gatherings, and some
workplaces.67 More troubling still, residential segregation is strongly associated with
adherence to negative racial stereotypes, and selection effects only explain part of the
heightened animosity toward minorities in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods.68
What’s more, exclusionary club goods may be particularly desirable for people who
prefer both sociability and racial homogeneity among their neighbors. Outside of
selecting the cooperative form, it may be difficult for a community to prompt selfselection on the basis of preferences for frequent social interactions.
63

Common amenities that do not promote social interactions among neighbors would, by hypothesis, prove
less attractive as exclusionary club goods. For example, one would not expect to see garbage collection
services, gardening services, or maid services functioning as exclusionary amenities with great frequency.

64

To the extent that they do care, they will care because of a belief that their successors in interest will have
more substantial interactions with neighbors, and the composition of a neighborhood may affect the home’s
resale value. See Dawkins, supra note 24, at 391.
65

The social nature of many club goods also allows prospective purchasers to obtain information about
neighborhood composition at a low cost. See supra text following note 23. By contrast, in a neighborhood
with neither common spaces nor front porches, it may be difficult for a prospective purchaser to discover
the characteristics of the neighborhood’s residents.

66

Lee Sigelman et al., Making Contact? Black-White Social Interaction in an Urban Setting, 101 AM. J. OF
SOCIOLOGY 1306, 1324-26 (1996). For a discussion of other troubling implications of homogeneity within
common interest communities, see MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 188-192.
67

Charles T. Clotfelter, Spatial Rearrangement and the Tiebout Hypothesis: The Case of School
Desegregation, 42 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 263, 268 (1975) (noting that whites’ opposition to residential
integration is strongest when they believe that residential integration will result in the desegregation of
local public schools); Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, Job Information Networks,
Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 1056, 1071-82, 1092 (2004); Wilfred G. Marston &
Thomas L. Van Valey, The Role of Residential Segregation in the Assimilation Process, 441 ANNALS A.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 13 (1979). But cf. Timothy Bledsoe et al., Residential Context and Racial
Solidarity Among African Americans, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 434, 451-53 (1995) (finding that residence in
integrated neighborhoods and increased social contact with whites may decrease social solidarity among
African Americans).
68

J. Eric Oliver & Janelle Wong, Intergroup Prejudice in Mutliethnic Settings, 47 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 567,
577-80 (2003); see also Donald R. Kinder & Tali Mendelberg, Cracks in American Apartheid: The
Political Impact of Prejudice Among Desegregated Whites, 57 J. POLITICS 402, 420 (1995) (finding strong
correlations between residence in largely white communities and adherence to negative stereotypes about
African Americans).
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The second distinction is economic. Private goods are excludable. Hence, where
the law sees no variation in kitchen sizing, it might examine the costs and benefits of
permitting variance,69 and perhaps mandate variance if the cost-benefit calculus suggests
that an invidious motive is at work. Semi-excludable club goods present more difficult
issues. With those goods, there may be a very good reason for requiring that each
individual contribute toward the good in question. In the absence of such a mandate,
residents who value the good could have strong incentives to try to free ride on their
neighbors’ contributions. The strength of this justification for mandatory membership in
the non-excludable goods context can provide excellent cover for bad acts.70 Thus the
legal system usually will have a great deal of difficulty discerning which club goods are
motivated by a desire to solve a collective action problem and which are motivated by
more nefarious objectives.
C.

Exclusionary Club Goods in Action

To date, the discussion has been rather abstract. Are there real-world instances of
developers using exclusionary club good strategies? An example from the Washington,
D.C. suburbs suggests an affirmative answer. At the very least, this example shows that
developers are conscious of the ways in which the presence or absence of communal
amenities can deter certain groups of undesirable residents from joining a new common
interest community and that targeted consumers understand those messages.71
Fall Church, Virginia, like many suburban communities, has had trouble keeping
its tax burden low while maintaining high quality public schools for its residents.72 One
69

Variance in this context means a development with both large and small kitchens.

70

This explains why plaintiffs asserting disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act would face an
uphill battle if they attacked a private developer’s use of exclusionary amenities. See supra note 60.

71

This essay focuses on developers’ uses of exclusionary club goods, as opposed to decisions by populated
common interest communities to add exclusionary club goods. Barzel and Sass provide an illuminating
explanation for why one might expect to see developers making decisions about common amenities, instead
of leaving this decision to residents. See Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by
Voting, Q. J. ECON. 745, 764-65 (1990). They argue that creating expensive common amenities in a
preexisting community will generate substantial controversy, particularly where residents will derive
differential utility from these amenities. Complex voting procedures will be needed to resolve these
disputes, particularly in common interest communities that have homes of different sizes and values. Id. At
765-770.
My account is consistent with Barzel and Sass’s, although it supplements it in important ways.
Demand for certain common interest communities may sort potential residents of a community in many
ways, potentially contributing to homogeneities beyond a common desire for the amenity in question.
Thus, developers may create common amenities at the outset, not only because creating such amenities
would be more difficult down the road, but also because the absence of such an amenity at the outset will
persuade potential purchasers who would like that amenity to purchase elsewhere instead. Indeed, it may
be that the presence of certain common amenities promotes homogeneity across a number of dimensions,
and these forms of homogeneity lend themselves to less contentious governance within common-interestcommunities.
72

See John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and Throughout the Nation:
Future Housing Supply and Demand Analysis for the Greater Washington Area, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 153,
175-76 (2004).
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way of satisfying both objectives involves trying to limit the development of new housing
that is attractive to families with children. To that end, the Falls Church government
permitted Waterford Development to build Broadway, an 80-unit condominium, but gave
the developer a financial incentive to ensure that no more than eight school children
moved into the complex.73 For the ninth child living in Broadway, and every additional
child beyond nine, the developer would have to pay Falls Church $15,000.74 The
developer agreed to pay such fees for the first five years of the development’s life.75
The Broadway’s developer described his response to this ordinance to a
Washington Post reporter:
The president of Waterford Development, Jan A. Zachariasse, said he was
happy to accommodate the city to win approval of the building, which is
under construction on Route 7 at the center of the city.
Coming in under the eight-child ceiling was easy, he said, because
a building’s demographics can be shaped by simply choosing the right
amenities. The Broadway, for example, has a cozy library and a clubroom
with a billiard table and bar. It does not have a playroom.
...
Once the deal was signed, “I could steer the project in a certain
direction to maximize or minimize the number of children,” Zachariasse
said. “You didn’t have to be a brain surgeon to decide which way to
go.”76
By providing a library and bar, but failing to provide a playroom, the developer made the
development in question attractive to childless residents but less attractive to families. A
real estate agent who sold units in the development noted that families with many
children never even inquired about living in the Broadway.77
It is hardly surprising that developers understand how to use exclusionary club
goods. The only surprising aspect of this story is Zachariasse’s willingness to discuss his
actions and motivations so candidly with a Washington Post correspondent. Zachariasse
73

Peter Whoriskey, No Kids? That’s No Problem; Falls Church’s Deal with Builder Highlights Area
School Crowding, WASH. POST, May 25, 2003, at A1.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. I thank Lee Fennell for bringing the Falls Church incident to my attention.

77

Id (“We haven't had any inquiries from people with lots of kids. It's kind of like how water seeks its own
level. It just happens.") (quoting Mary Alice Kaplan). In other contexts, housing consumers with a choice
of suburbs seem to understand that the choice of common sporting activities entails a choice about the
nature of one’s neighbors and social networks. A New York Times series on class in America quoted a
homeowners’ description of his Atlanta suburb and the role played by tennis in organizing social
interactions thusly: “The good thing about it is that it is a very comfortable neighborhood to live in. . . .
These are very homogeneous types of groups. You play tennis with them, you have them over to dinner.
You go to the same parties. . . . When you talk about tennis, guess what? Everybody you play against
looks and acts and generally feels like you. It doesn’t give you much of a perspective.” Peter T. Kilborn,
The Five-Bedroom, Six-Figure Rootless Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at A1 (quoting Jim Link).
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lived to regret his candor, no doubt, as the Department of Housing and Urban
Development launched an investigation into Falls Church and Waterford Development
for violating the Fair Housing Act by intentionally discriminating against families with
children.78 The investigation ultimately resulted in a settlement, whereby Falls Church
agreed to alter the way in which it collects school impact fees from developers, and the
developers agreed to devote $120,000 toward training its employees to avoid further
discrimination against families with children.79
Following this settlement, one expects that developers will be more tight-lipped
when discussing their provision of amenities in residential developments. This raises a
serious problem. How are agencies charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws to
ensure that the laws are not thwarted through exclusionary amenities strategies once
developers learn from Zachariasse’s mistake and instead offer pretextual but plausible
explanations for exclusionary club good strategies?
There are two reasonable responses to this question. One possible, and perhaps
appropriate, response is to do nothing. For reasons I will identify in the conclusion, this
will sometimes be the best approach in light of the danger that the cure for exclusionary
amenities will be even worse than the disease. But it will be an unsatisfying approach in
those instances where anti-discrimination laws reflect important normative commitments.
A second possible response is to try to identify club goods that seem particularly
susceptible to exclusionary strategies, and then devote careful scrutiny to developers’ use
of those kinds of goods. In the section that follows I will identify a few trends in the
residential golf course industry and raise the possibility that residential golf courses
sometimes have functioned as exclusionary club goods, with African Americans as the
“undesirable” group targeted for exclusion.
D.

Golf and Race in the United States

During the 1990s, if you told me that an American citizen played golf, I would
have been able to make a highly accurate guess about that individual’s race. Among
warm weather leisure activities attracting 25 million or more participants, golf stood out
as the most racially segregated. During the period from 1994 to 1995, 27.7 million
Caucasian Americans participated in golf, or approximately 16.9 % of all Caucasians 15
and older.80 By contrast, only 900,000 African Americans participated in golf during that
timeframe, comprising just 4.2% of the African American population.81 Once the size of
these groups is adjusted to reflect the general population of the United States, we see that
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R. JEFF TEASLEY ET AL., RECREATION AND WILDERNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (University of
Georgia Dept. of Agricultural & Applied Economics Working Paper) (date), available in
<http://www.agecon.uga.edu/~erag/finalreport.htm> (visited Jan. 1, 2005).
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93.4% of all golfers were Caucasian, 3.1% were African American, and 3.4% classified
themselves as “other,” a group that includes Latinos and Asian Americans.82 More recent
data suggests that African American golfers played fewer rounds of golf than Caucasian
golfers did, which would skew the participation data even further.83
The data suggests that during the 1990s golf was a substantially better proxy for
race than income and a somewhat better proxy than household wealth.84 That differential
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Id. Data from a 1997 study showed an even more substantial gap in participation. In that year, 2.7% of
African Americans participated in golf, versus 12.6% of Caucasians. Jill Lieber, Golf Finally Reaching
Out: Programs Seek More Diversity, yet Progress Remains Limited, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 2001, at C1
(quoting statistics from a 1997 study by the National Golf Foundation). For an explanation of the various
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ADMIN. 46, 48-49 (1998).
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See NATIONAL GOLF FOUND., MINORITY GOLF PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S. 6 (2003) (noting that the
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played 13.9 rounds during the previous year). Some caution is in order in interpreting this data, however.
African American golf participation increased during the first few years of the millennium, and it may be
that an influx of new African American golfers explains the lower intensity of participation. See infra text
accompanying note 168.
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In 2000, 14.2% of Caucasians lived in households with annual incomes in excess of $100,000, whereas
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<http://print.infoplease.com/ipa/A0104552.html>. Thus, Caucasians are 2.3 times as likely as African
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Income inequality between Caucasians and African Americans has been diminishing consistently over
time. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MEASURING 50 YEARS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE C-7 (Sep. 1988); see also
Farley & Frey, supra note 4, at 30 (“[T]he percentage of blacks with economic status qualifying them for
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Distributions Converging? A Time Series Analysis, REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 91, 91, 104 (Summer 2002)
(finding that the black-white income gap converged until the 1960s, but has leveled off, as a result of
sharply declining incomes among poor African Americans). During the 1980s and 1990s, the racial gap
between blacks and whites participating in white collar jobs declined dramatically. In 1980, 36.6% of
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whites were in white-collar occupations. Marshall H. Medoff, Revisiting the Economic Hypothesis and
Positional Segregation, REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 83, 91 (Summer 2004).
Wealth is more racially skewed than income in the United States, a result partially due to
decreasing marginal consumption as incomes rise, demographic variables, asset allocation decisions, and
disproportionate demands for assistance from low-income kin faced by higher-income African Americans.
Joseph G. Altonji, Ulrich Doraszelski & Lewis Segal, Black/White Differences in Wealth, ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 38, 48-49; N.S. Chiteji & Darrick Hamilton, Family Connections and the Black-White
Wealth Gap Among Middle-Class Families, REV. BLACK POLITICAL ECON. 1, 21-25 (Summer 2002).
Wealth differentials, though, appear to be less dramatic than golfing participation differentials, as well.
See, e.g., Sharmila Choudhury, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth and Asset Choices, 64 Social
Security Bull. 1, 8 tbl. 3 (2002) (noting that a white in the top quartile of whites in their 60s had to have
$551,818 in net worth, whereas a black in the top quartile of blacks in their 60s needed to have $247,555 in
net worth). Between 1969 and 1995, the percentage of Southern Caucasians in the top 3 U.S. wealth
quintiles stayed constant at 60%, while the percentage of Southern African Americans in this group
increased from 27.6% to 34.6%. See MDC INC., INCOME AND WEALTH IN THE SOUTH: A STATE OF THE
SOUTH INTERIM REPORT 10 (May 1998). Moreover, among high-income, middle-aged college graduates,
wealth disparities between Caucasians and African Americans disappear. See Ronald L. Straight, Survey of
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is critical. After all, if income provided a better proxy for race than golf participation did,
those interested in residential racial homogeneity could have used large lot sizes or
occupancy restrictions to exclude African Americans. This strategy – referred to in the
literature as “exclusionary zoning” – is well documented and widely practiced.85 But
once substantial numbers of African American families achieve higher incomes and
higher wealth, exclusionary zoning strategies lose their effectiveness. Notably, during
the 1980s and 1990s, the United States saw a substantial exodus of African Americans
into the suburbs.86 Given the illegality of alternative discrimination strategies,
construction of an expensive, racially polarizing amenity may provide the next-“best”
strategy for keeping these upwardly mobile African Americans out of particular
communities.
Numbers from the same survey suggest that other land-based, warm weather
sports were far more racially integrated. For example, African Americans comprised
13.6% of joggers, 8.2% of bicyclists, 15.5% of baseball players, 19.1% of basketball
players, 8.3% of soccer players, and 12.6% of volleyball players.87 Even tennis,
stereotypically a leisure activity with low levels of African American participation,
attracted a rather integrated playing population. Fully 8.2% of tennis participants were
African American, and participation rates are not starkly different among the races.88
It is difficult to find any activities in which participation was as racially polarized
as golf during the 1990s. Sports that exhibit the same level of racial segregation as golf
tended to be either aquatic or snow-based. The only warm water sport with a greater
percentage of Caucasian participants was water skiing, which attracted approximately
half as many participants as golf did, and for which 94.4% of participants were
Caucasian. Motor boating was almost as segregated as golf, with 92.5% of participants
identifying as Caucasian, and 3.3% of participants identifying as African American.
Rock climbing exhibited a similar skew, but drew only 7.5 million participants in the
1994-95.89 Similarly, 94% of cross-country skiers were Caucasian, but the sport drew
less than 7 million participants.90
In short, there were roughly four categories of sports that exhibited heavy racial
disparities in participation levels during the mid 1990s: motor boat-based activities (such
2001). If one adjusts for age, income, education, and employment, interracial differences in wealth tend to
disappear. Id. at 80.
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African American. See Darden & Kamel, supra note 22, at 105-07.
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as motor boating and water skiing), cold weather activities (such as cross country skiing),
less popular warm weather activities (such as rock climbing), and golf. Of these, one
would expect to see golf provide the most attractive basis for an exclusionary club goods
strategy. After all, golf courses are quite expensive to develop and maintain (unlike rock
climbing walls);91 they can be built in virtually any climate (deserts, prairies, forests,
coastal regions, swamps, etc.) (unlike cross-country skiing courses or marinas); they can
be enjoyed by virtually any age demographic (again, unlike rock climbing walls); and
they do not generate potentially welfare-reducing noise externalities (unlike marinas that
house motor boats).92 Moreover, golf was historically associated with racial exclusion
and played at country clubs that had discriminatory membership policies.93 As a result,
golf “has the image of being a white man’s game.”94 To the extent that communities
wished to employ racially discriminatory selection mechanisms using exclusionary club
goods, golf presented the best opportunities.95 Given the racial dynamics of golfing in
the United States, a residential development built around a mandatory membership, highquality golf course would have attracted two types of people: avid golfers (who were
overwhelmingly white), and people with a preference for living among avid golfers or
non-golfers attracted to such communities. It is therefore worth investigating the
exclusionary amenities hypothesis by examining statistics on golf course-related
residential developments.
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W.J. Florkowski & G. Landry, An Economic Profile of Golf Courses in Georgia: Course and Landscape
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Club goods are not the only means of sorting residents. Saul Levmore has suggested to me that common
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This view is premised on the idea that golfers are at least somewhat evenly spread across income levels.
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E.

Golf Course Developments in the United States

A residential golf course is a golf course that is surrounded by residential
properties, be they single family homes, townhouses, or condominiums. During the
1990s, golf participation intensified,96 and the United States saw a rapid increase in the
number of residential golf course developments.97 By 2000, forty percent of current golf
course construction was residential, and the growth rate of residential golf courses far
outpaced the growth rate for real estate developments in general.98 In Florida, which has
more golf courses than any other state, as many as 54% of golf courses were residential.99
It would be inappropriate to assert at this juncture that the exclusionary club good
phenomenon I have identified is largely responsible for this boom in residential golf
courses. Alternative explanations cannot be discounted. That said, if one digs further
into the growth of residential golf communities, one finds several intriguing data points,
all of which are consistent with – but do not prove – the hypothesis that exclusionary club
goods were behind some of the changes in the nature of the residential golf course
market.
The first intriguing data point concerns the mix of mandatory golf course
memberships and optional membership for residents of residential golf communities.
Early residential golf course developments followed a particular financing model.
Namely, those who purchased residences in the development were obligated to purchase
“equity memberships” or “bundled memberships” in the adjoining golf course.100 This
meant that all homeowners would pay for the development and upkeep of the course,
regardless of their utilization of it. In the mid-to-late-1990s, however, the market shifted
somewhat, with developers increasingly embracing semi-private golf course
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The number of Americans who played one round or more per year declined from 27,800,000 in 1990 to
26,446,000 in 1999. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 761
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TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at 10, which is consistent with the exclusionary club goods hypothesis. See supra text
accompanying notes 174-176.
99

John J. Haydu & Alan W. Hodges, Economic Impacts of the Florida Golf Course Industry, at iv (April 5,
2002); see also Lewis M. Goodkin, Out of the Rough?, FLORIDA TREND, Dec. 1, 1998, available in 1998
WL 10743346 (quoting an earlier estimate that 40% of Florida’s golf courses are residential). In South
Carolina, approximately one-third of golf courses are residential. Jordan N. Roberts & Darla DomkeDamonte, Utilization of Golf Course Facilities by Residents of Golf Course Communities in Myrtle Beach,
1 COASTAL BUSINESS JOURNAL 13, 14 (date).
100

Goodkin, supra note 99.

22

developments, where membership is optional among homeowners and members of the
public can play for a daily use fee.101 This brings us to a second intriguing data point.
There are two group of golf courses that did not shift away from equity
memberships: high end courses played by the very wealthy and courses located in areas
with the largest African American populations, such as Broward and Miami-Dade
counties.102 For wealthy homeowners, mandatory golf course membership might have
functioned in the same way that the cooperative structure functioned in Manhattan.
Wealthy people can afford to pay a premium for the perceived benefits of exclusionary
policies and are happy to do so. Instead of paying more for apartments and association
governance via the cooperative corporate form, these Floridians might have been opting
for a luxury amenity that effectively excluded those who were unwilling to pay
substantial amounts for a world class golf facility.
To complete the story, we must introduce a final intriguing data point. Many
purchasers who buy into residential golf courses do not play golf. This phenomenon of
non-golfer households in residential golf communities has been widely noted in golf
industry periodicals, and was true during timeframes when “mandatory membership” golf
course developments were more common than “optional membership” developments.103
To be sure, not all of these people are overt racists or segregationists.104 Indeed, it is
likely that many of these non-golfing residential golf course dwellers are willing to pay a
premium because they enjoy the open space or low densities offered within golf course
101

Id.

102
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regularly.”); Crompton, supra note 97, at 193 (citing McElyea); Goodkin, supra note 99 (quoting a
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down the prevalence of non-golfers in mandatory membership developments. I am searching for such data,
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developments.105 That said, real estate appraisal research suggest that golf course views
provide only one-third as much of an increase in real estate values as views of a creek or
marsh.106 Artificial lakes and waterways evidently add more value and are cheaper to
maintain than golf courses,107 and yet they are much less of a mainstay of new real estate
developments than golf courses.108 Rather surprisingly, proximity to a golf course
appears to add less to residential property values than it does to commercial, industrial,
institutional, or agricultural properties.109 In short, golf courses qua golf courses add less
value to nearby or adjacent residences than one might expect.
So a desire for open space did not seem to be driving all the demand for
residential golf courses among non golfers. Is there any evidence for more insidious
explanations? The marketing data appears to suggest that many non-golfer residents of
residential golf courses find the homogenous nature of these communities’ populations
appealing. D. Robert DeChaine has conducted the only systematic study of the ways in
which residential golf communities market themselves.110 DeChaine noted the
recurring themes emphasized in the persuasive sales appeals for golf
community property. These themes included focus on the ‘purity’ of the
community; the privacy and exclusivity of community membership; the
safety, security, and serenity of a lifestyle removed from the maddening
crowds; the prestige of the golf course as a community focal point; and the
sense of freedom afforded by spacious property and surroundings.111
Certainly, marketing materials talked about the quality of the golf courses at length,112
but DeChaine appeared to notice as much, if not more, emphasis on the exclusivity of
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golf-courses behind gates, membership rules that limited outsiders’ access to the
property, and the homogeneity of the community’s residents.113
If one reads advertisements for mandatory membership golf communities, it is
occasionally possible to see not-so-subtle exclusionary messages. The web site for
Harbour Ridge, a residential golf community in Stuart, Florida, describes its community
this way:
Harbour Ridge Yacht & Country Club is a warm and friendly community
of 695 families. Every resident at Harbour Ridge is a member of the Club,
thus ensuring universal interest in the care and integrity of the community
and the club.
Members come from every section of the United States, Germany,
England, France and many other countries. They bring with them the
traditions of some of their nations’, and the world’s, great golf clubs.
Members embrace traditional values and are known to jealously guard
their privacy and comfort.114
Harbour Ridge’s advertisement seems evocative enough to send clear messages to
prospective purchasers about the nature of the community.115 Other segregated
residential golf communities opt for a less subtle approach, selecting names like
“Magnolia Greens Golf Plantation” or “Sea Trail Plantation.”116
In some ways this focus on exclusivity in marketing materials should not be
surprising. Even if non-golfers were to constitute a small minority of members within
mandatory membership residential golf communities, one would expect to see developers
working hard to try to attract them. After all, the golfers within mandatory membership
communities in some sense free ride off the contributions by non-golfers for course
upkeep. So someone who loved playing golf, but did not have strong preferences for
residential homogeneity or heterogeneity, might rationally prefer to live in a community
where non-golf-playing mandatory members subsidized his golfing. Easy access to tee
times, a lack of crowding, and little waiting on the course would all be attractive
amenities to such golfers.
113
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Optional membership residential golf communities, on the other hand, should not
have been expected to market themselves to non-golfers with a preference for
homogeneity. After all, an optional membership residential community faces a tragedy
of the commons if too many non-golfers join it. The tragedy of the commons arises when
many people try to take advantage of the views and open space provided by a golf course,
but only those residents who are members of the course pay for its upkeep. A residential
community can solve this tragedy of the commons only by shifting toward some form of
mandatory membership or by permitting non-residents to use its course, which potentially
raises privacy, safety, or traffic concerns for residents.117
This account of exclusionary club goods therefore provides a testable hypothesis.
Did optional membership residential golf communities have higher percentages of
African American residents than equivalent mandatory membership golf communities?
Given the prevalence of both types of communities in Florida, it is possible to answer this
question, controlling for home prices, resident income, and other attributes. Tom Miles
and I are planning to gather the 2000 census and demographic data that will allow us to
test this hypothesis, and also to investigate whether the racial composition of golf
communities in general differed substantially from the racial composition of non-golf
gated communities. This study cannot definitively demonstrate that residential golf
communities function as exclusionary club goods, because it will not allow us to
disaggregate sorting and focal point mechanisms, but it can show whether mandatory
membership residential golf courses have a racially disparate impact in the residential
setting and whether (as this essay hypothesizes) residential golf communities are even
more segregated than golf participation in general is. This data, combined with the
circumstantial evidence outlined above, may raise a strong inference that exclusionary
club goods strategies are being pursued by developers. In any event, we hope to be able
to obtain the data that will allow us to shed more light on the golf courses-asexclusionary-amenities hypothesis in a follow-up, empirical paper.
Regardless of the outcome of that empirical investigation, however, the popularity
of bundling residential developments with participation in a costly activity that exhibited
dramatic racial skews should be particularly disconcerting to those who find residential
segregation troubling. During the 1990s residential golf communities could have
functioned as exclusionary amenities, and prompted several behavioral dynamics that
lend themselves to dramatic segregation if housing consumers were responding
“rationally” to widespread preferences among whites for substantial residential racial
homogeneity. Namely, such communities would have attracted whites who wanted racial
homogeneity, golfers who did not care about racial homogeneity, but were
overwhelmingly white, and whites who did not care about racial homogeneity so much as
117

For discussions of the heated debates that arise when optional-membership golf communities try to
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a form of cultural homogeneity. This latter group would be happy to live with
“assimilationist” African Americans – precisely those African Americans who would
make a conscious decision to live in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods and
participate in a sporting activity that has historically been closed to blacks.118 These
sorting and focal point mechanisms would have been reinforced by the behavior of
middle- or upper-income African Americans who did not want to pay for a costly
resource that they are unlikely to use, did not want to be the “token” family in an
overwhelmingly white environment,119 or do not want to live in neighborhoods where
they will encounter hostility or social snubs from their neighbors.120 An exclusionary
amenities strategy could enable all these effects to operate in unison.
F.

Other Examples of Exclusionary Amenities

Before ending this part of the discussion, it is worth noting the possibility that
exclusionary amenities might be used as part of a less obnoxious strategy for promoting
residential homogeneity. Racial exclusion is, for very good reasons, regarded as more
problematic than other forms of residential sorting. In the pages that follow, I will show
how communities can employ exclusionary amenities strategies to achieve innocuous, or
perhaps even beneficial, objectives.
1.

Exclusionary Religious Goods

Suppose the existence of a religious minority, scattered within a large
metropolitan area. Suppose further that members of this religious minority value
homogeneity in matters of faith and behavior, and that they feel a critical mass of
believers in a confined geographic space is necessary for the religious community to
thrive.121 In such a setting, one might expect to see the community embrace direct efforts
to limit the entrants of nonbelievers into the community. For example, a homeowners’
association might record covenants barring property sales to people who are not members
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of the religious community in question. Alas, such restraints on alienation have been
invalidated by courts as contrary to public policy.122
Reliance on exclusionary amenities may provide an alternative strategy. In such a
scheme, the community would place a large religious temple at the center of the
community, and provide that all homeowners within the association must share the
expenses and burdens of the church’s upkeep. This church could function as an
exclusionary club good if some of the community’s members do not plan to attend the
church but want to be surrounded by church goers.123 As a doctrinal matter, it seems as
though such a requirement to pay for a common amenity would satisfy the various
requirements necessary for covenants or equitable servitudes to bind successors in
interest.124 Because an exclusionary club good merely taxes incoming property owners
who do not share the faith, without restraining alienation to them outright, such a
financing scheme arguably would not violate public policy.125 After all, covenants and
equitable servitudes restricting religious institutions from common interest communities
have long been deemed enforceable, based on pro-contract and state neutrality rationales
that could be logically extended to cover mandates that homeowners subsidize resident
religious institutions.126
So if the exclusionary amenities strategy might permit religious communities
from achieving what they could not otherwise achieve without violating antidiscrimination law, why has no community tried this approach? Until recently, that
question remained a puzzle, but developers in Collier County, Florida appear poised to
use the exclusionary amenities strategy to create Ave Maria Township, a place some are
calling “America’s first gated Catholic community.”127 Marketing the for-profit
development exclusively to Catholics is illegal. So developers have tied the development
to Ave Maria University, a Catholic institution of higher learning founded by Domino’s
Pizza founder, Tom Monaghan.128 Besides noting the development’s proximity to the
new university and its many resources, Monaghan describes a “stunning church in the
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Fair Housing Act, a religious organization may discriminate on the basis of religion with respect to housing
that the organization owns or controls through a non-profit. See United States v. Columbus Country Club,
915 F.2d 877, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1990). A for-profit developer would not be able to take advantage of this
exemption. Id.
123

For example, people may feel like “cultural” Jews or Catholics, even if they are not religiously
observant. It could be rational for such people to pay for a Synagogue or Church, even if they never
planned to attend services, so as to attract people with whom they share cultural affinities to the
community.

124

See supra note 92.

125

Under the Restatement approach, an equitable servitudes generally binds successors unless it is (1)
“arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious”; (2) “unreasonably burdens a fundamental constitutional right”; (3)
“imposes an unreasonable restraint on alienation, . . . trade or competition”; or is (4) unconscionable.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000).
126

See, e.g., Hall v. Church of the Open Bible, 89 N.W.2d 798, 799-800 (Wis. 1958).

127

Adam Reilly, City of God: Tom Monaghan’s Coming Catholic Utopia, BOSTON PHOENIX, June 17,
2005.
128

Id.

28

center of town” and private chapels “within walking distance of each home,” envisioning
“an extremely Catholic” population.129 The developers anticipate that the development
will be “primarily Catholic,” especially at the outset, but stress that they were “not going
to discriminate or market to Catholics.”130 Of course, what’s implicit in the developer’s
statement is explicit in this essay: One can create a primarily Catholic development
without any targeted marketing or overt discrimination. Once again, developers seem to
understand this dynamic, even though the law does not.
Although club goods are a term of art in the economic literature, the religious
context shows that the universe of exclusionary club goods may include amenities that
are merely the functional equivalent of club goods. For example, religious institutions
are quite racially segregated in general, and many congregations are racially
homogenous.131 Because members of a religious community typically value proximity to
their place of worship, the presence of a church or temple may, independently, promote
racial sorting in the surrounding neighborhood. A developer interested in promoting
racial homogeneity in his new development might therefore sell a large plot of land
within the development to a segregated congregation on quite favorable terms, and then
raise the price of the surrounding homes as a means of recouping this subsidy. The
church will not be, formally speaking, a club good, in the sense that purchasing a home in
the subdivision entitles one to use the church.132 But it will function like an exclusionary
club good, in the sense that all homeowners in the development will be subsidizing the
church’s land implicitly, and only people who worship at the church or value the kinds of
residential homogeneity associated with the church’s members will be deriving any
benefit from this subsidy. As a result, one might expect to see a heavy racial skew in the
neighborhood’s population. For this reason, it makes sense to group exclusionary club
goods with other kinds of exclusionary amenities.
It makes sense to include public goods in the discussion of exclusionary amenities
as well. Local public goods, which confer greater utility on proximate citizens, will
function in an analogous way to club goods in a homeowners’ association. Local taxes
will simply replace association assessments as a sorting mechanism. As the example that
follows suggests, however, the Internet has made it possible to use non-local public
goods as exclusionary amenities as well.
2.

Exclusionary Public Goods

Although this paper focuses on club goods in residential communities, we should
not be surprised to observe the same phenomena in virtual communities as well. Indeed,
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participants in various virtual worlds have developed alternative languages, with their
own grammars and conventions, many of which prove befuddling to the uninitiated.133
Although some of these languages appropriate internal messaging abbreviations that help
shorten the length of typed communications, the most important on-line language – l33t
(“leet”) is properly understood as facilitating encryption, not communication. As a result,
l33t is more cumbersome to use than ordinary American English.134 Efficiency
considerations do not explain the proliferation of l33t: Using English would be easier for
most of the inhabitants of these online communities.
Imposing these barriers to entry may maximize welfare for these communities by
making participation in these online communities vexing for a naïve newcomer, who the
computer savvy refer to as a “n00b” (newbie). A major purpose of these languages is to
marginalize newbies and exclude the virtual riff-raff.135 Newbies can of course learn l33t
eventually, but this process will take time, and that lag will encourage the greenest
entrants into virtual worlds to spend more time observing and less time typing during
their initial forays. l33t thus functions as a means of discouraging those who are nonsavvy, impatient, or unwilling to incur substantial language-learning costs from joining
Internet-based subcultures.136
III.

Inclusionary Amenities

In the previous pages, I have suggested that an exclusionary amenities strategy is
neither good nor evil. Rather, it might further good or evil purposes, depending on the
particular setting in which it is employed. Normative considerations might cause us to
view the use of an exclusionary amenities strategy unfavorably if used by Caucasians to
exclude African Americans from an affluent neighborhood, but favorably if used by
members of a religious minority that risks losing its identity to establish a critical mass of
believers in a particular physical space.137 This discussion of exclusionary amenities
raises an obvious implication. Inclusionary amenities should also exist. The presence of
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such goods would spark residential heterogeneity, and the absence of such goods should
function in the same way as the presence of an exclusionary amenities.
A.

Examples of Inclusionary Club Goods

An inclusionary club good is a heterogeneity-promoting resource that does not, by
itself, provide enough welfare to the existing residents of a particular community to
explain its presence. On the other hand, the inclusionary club good does make the
community attractive to residents who would not otherwise choose to live there.
Inclusionary club goods are likely to arise in settings where the members of a community
believe that they share undesirable homogeneities, and that the community will be better
off if a more heterogeneous resident pool is integrated into the community. Inclusionary
club goods will be adopted, in short, to make the composition of a building or
development better reflect the heterogeneity that exists in the wider surrounding
community.
For example, some student residential buildings on college campuses acquire
reputations as non-academically rigorous, and sometimes these reputations are well
deserved. At some point, members of a community may decide that this reputation for a
lack of rigor is imposing substantial costs on the members – such as diminished access to
employment networks, lower status relative to members of other communities, or undue
scrutiny from university administrators. To that end, the members may decide to devote
a large amount of scarce public space to a “study room,” and renovate the study room to
make it look tranquil, attractive, and nicely furnished. The study room may then go
unused by the residents, especially during its early years. But as time passes, and
successive groups of incoming residents come and go, the presence of the study room
might cause more studious students to self select into the house, and some of these
newcomers may eventually start using the amenity. Initially, the study room functions as
an inclusionary club good, but eventually it is transformed into an ordinary club good that
is welfare maximizing in its own terms.138
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that inclusionary club goods of this nature are
common.139 Some condominium buildings provide gyms that are underutilized by the
members, but the space is not converted to higher utility uses because of a concern that
the absence of a gym would send the wrong message to certain kinds of buyers.
Similarly, some condominiums maintain party rooms and other social spaces that go
underutilized by its introverted residents. The idea here is that incoming buyers may
value sociability within a condo’s corridors, but that reliable information about sociability
is hard to come by for many potential purchasers. The party room may provide a
reassuring message to such potential purchasers and, over time, it may become a more
efficiently utilized amenity through the operation of selection effects.140
Local governments use inclusionary public goods to compete for heterogeneous
residents, as well. In recent years, communities with declining economic bases, like
Peoria, Memphis, and Fresno, have begun investing significant resources in the creation
of “artist colonies” and other efforts to attract young members of the creative class.141
This effort, inspired in large part by Richard Florida’s influential book, The Rise of the
Creative Class,142 is designed to boost economic growth by attracting the young,
energetic, well-educated, art and culture lovers who are sought after by major employers.
As a result of this argument, communities across the United States are investing in public
goods and club goods that are not terribly appealing to the communities’ existing
populations.143
The movement toward magnet schools in urban public school districts reflects a
similar dynamic. In many cities, white flight has rendered the population of urban school
districts, and cities themselves, heavily African American and Latino.144 This widespread
exercise of the exit option by middle-class whites has imposed real costs on the lower139
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income populations that lack the resources to exit urban school districts.145 Several cities
have tried to counter this trend by investing heavily in selective magnet schools as a
means of attracting middle class parents back to public school systems.146 In
communities where the magnet schools rely on aptitude tests or grades to help assign
coveted slots to students, the existing population of a city may derive little direct benefit
from these schools – few children from poor neighborhoods have the credentials to be
admitted to selective magnets. Support for these schools may still exist in poorer parts of
the city, however, on the theory that attracting middle-class white parents back to the
school district will, in the long run, result in an expansion of resources available to all the
district’s schools. To the extent that such a dynamic plays out, a magnet school will
function as an inclusionary public good.
As some of these examples suggest, people concerned about various forms of
residential homogeneity should perhaps get excited about the inclusionary amenities
strategy. Though they appear to be vastly outnumbered by those Americans who prefer
homogenous subdivisions, there is a constituency of Americans who want to live in
neighborhoods that exhibit genuine racial and economic diversity. The young, upwardly
mobile urban pioneers who have been gobbling up “edgy” loft apartments within earshot
of Los Angeles’s skid row.147
Two important points about inclusionary amenities are worth making before
proceeding further. First, although I suspect that exclusionary amenities are more
common than inclusionary amenities, examples of the latter may spring to mind more
readily. The most likely explanation for this behavior is that people are quite willing to
talk about inclusionary motivations, and reticent to discuss exclusionary strategies in
polite society. So, when developers create exclusionary amenities, they will be reluctant
to discuss their true motivations out of fear of violating antidiscrimination laws or
generating controversy. Indeed, their marketing strategies may be aimed at would-be
customers who, thanks to unconscious racism, prefer racial homogeneity, but would be
reluctant to admit that preference to third parties or even themselves.148 By contrast,
inclusionary amenities designed to increase heterogeneity within a residential setting are
generally thought laudable, and may even require substantial publicity if they are to be
effective. For instance, if Peoria wants to create an artists’ colony, it cannot simply draw
on artists who live in Peoria’s suburbs.149 Rather, it will need a regional, or perhaps even
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national, campaign in order to achieve the critical mass of artists who will alter the nature
of the community.150 That said, inclusionary amenities often will be unnecessary because
there are no legal prohibitions on inclusionary advertisements. This situation contrasts
sharply with the legal regime governing exclusionary advertisements, which helps drive
the use of exclusionary amenities. When should one expect to find inclusionary
amenities, then? Perhaps only in those instances where “talk is cheap” and a more
expensive investment in inclusion is necessary to attract a heterogeneous audience to a
homogeneous community.
Second, the determination of what constitutes an exclusionary or inclusionary
amenity will be highly context-dependent. It is possible to imagine circumstances under
which a particular amenity might exclude in some contexts and include in others. For
instance, if citizens in a predominantly poor African American neighborhood decided to
replace a dilapidated public housing project with a high-quality golf course surrounded
by stylish bungalows, the residential golf course would function as an inclusionary club
good – a resource designed to desegregate a heavily segregated neighborhood, and make
its population more reflective of the racial and economic diversity that exists in the
United States more generally. Indeed, residents have pursued a similar strategy at the
Franklin Park Golf Club in Boston, a racially mixed golf club described as “a large oasis
of peace and racial harmony within a generally hostile environment.”151
B.

Inclusionary Club Good Voids

Just as inclusionary club goods can be used to attract diverse residents to
heterogeneous communities, communities can maintain their homogeneity through
conscious choices to avoid inclusionary club goods or public goods. A desire to avoid
offering inclusionary club goods might cause community residents to forego provision of
the communal resources that their residents would otherwise prefer.152
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For instance, many communities desire access to public transportation hubs.
Even if such hubs are shunned by commuters, who increasingly prefer to drive to work
alone, they provide enormous value to those not yet old enough to drive, those too old to
drive, and those unable to afford or use motor vehicles of their own. People who drive to
work every day may garner substantial benefits from having bus or subway routes
nearby, for example, by freeing up scarce freeway space or making it easier for
babysitters, house cleaners, or other car-less service providers to reach their homes.153
Perhaps most importantly, proximity to efficient light rail and subway lines generally
increases property values.154 Yet many communities are nearly devoid of efficient public
transportation.
Part of the resistance to public transportation may stem from concerns about the
extent to which such transportation amounts to an inclusionary public good. For
example, in the process of planning the Washington, D.C. subway, citizens in various
relatively affluent areas opposed the establishment of subway stations because of
concerns that inner city denizens would ride the subways into their neighborhoods.155
Affluent neighborhoods in other parts of the country have done likewise, even keeping

hence are less likely to be offended when I complain of what to me is excessive noise. A
covenant against “unreasonable noise” may be too imprecise to accomplish my
objectives. I therefore may prefer a more certain surrogate that reflects the level of
comfort to which I aspire. If I believe that the presence of trailers is positively correlated
with bothersome levels of noise, a covenant against trailer homes may serve this proxy
role.
Gillette, supra note 26, at 1396; see also MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 76-77 (making a similar
point, an noting that those who wanted to preserve racial segregation after Shelley v. Kraemer
viewed covenants “that targeted certain objectionable practices” as “the next best thing to race
restrictive covenants”). The essential difference between Gillette’s example and my own is
strategic. Gillette focuses on covenants that restrict the use of particular private goods, whereas
my examples show how the same objectives can be satisfied through the provision (or lack
thereof) of club and public goods.
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out valuable transportation amenities like freeways.156 Exclusionary zoning would be
adequate to keep the poor from living in these communities, but an exclusionary dearth of
public goods is necessary to keep them out entirely.157 The desire to exclude, in some
communities, is sufficiently powerful to overcome the added value associated with transit
improvements.
IV.

Regulating the Provision of Exclusionary and Inclusionary Amenities

So far, this paper has shown how communities can use exclusionary amenities or
an absence of inclusionary amenities to promote residential homogeneity. As I
suggested, there will be instances in which many readers will sympathize with this
behavior (e.g., critical mass for a marginalized religious minority), and instances in which
most readers will not sympathize (e.g., racial homogeneity, achieved through the use of
mandatory golf club memberships). How should the law respond to these efforts? I offer
preliminary thoughts below, and hope that these ideas will spark debate and discussion.
A.

A Normative Framework

My approach to this topic, as to most other topics, is for the most part welfarist.
With respect to social welfare, the analysis should, and does, depend, very much on the
characteristics of the groups being included or excluded. For example, there is a wealth
of social science evidence pointing to the enormous social costs of residential racial
segregation.158 These costs appear to fall particularly heavily on racial minorities, in that
the exclusion of minorities from residential communities engenders their absence from
valuable social networks.159 The exclusion of various groups from affluent residential
communities may also undermine meritocratic values in the sense that members of these
residential communities achieve extra economic and social advancement by virtue of that
residence, as opposed to individual merit.160 A welfarist account of religious or linguistic
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exclusion might reach quite different results, although the dearth of empirical evidence
on this score may reduce this analysis to educated guesswork.
Welfarism is, of course, not the only criterion for evaluating the use of
exclusionary amenities, and, to be sure, non-welfarist considerations have emerged in my
treatment of this issue. Distributionalist treatments of the subject may focus on the extent
to which exclusionary club goods are used by the resource-rich to marginalize the
resource-poor.161 Reviewing the cases reviewed herein, it seems that exclusionary
amenities are often used by the relatively affluent or powerful to exclude members of
relatively less affluent or less powerful groups from their midst. That said, the exclusion
of racial minorities from gated communities, for example, is typically directed against the
more affluent members of a relatively poor racial group. Indeed, in this respect, the use
of exclusionary amenities to keep middle-income blacks out of white neighborhoods or to
keep moderate-income Protestants out of Catholic neighborhoods is far less problematic
than the use of exclusionary zoning techniques to keep the poor out of wealthier
neighborhoods.
B.

Anti-Discrimination Law

This essay has argued that when the law bars discriminatory restraints on
alienation, entry, and advertising, communities whose residents prefer particular kinds of
homogeneity may substitute an exclusionary-amenities-strategy or a lack-of-inclusionaryamenities-strategy. This raises the question of what is worse: the medicine or the
disease? If the exclusionary amenities strategy produces worse societal outcomes than
overt discrimination, savvy policymakers might contemplate doing away with
antidiscrimination laws altogether.
Exclusionary amenities present a form of discrimination less “efficient” than overt
discrimination. There are social costs and social benefits that result from this
inefficiency, however. The social costs are the deadweight losses that result from the
expenditure of scarce societal resources on sorting club goods. For example, I have
suggested that society may have built too many residential golf courses during the 1990s
– resulting in wasteful land use policies and, in this instance, substantial environmental
damage.162 Repealing anti-discrimination laws might well eliminate this excess demand
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for golf course construction. On the other hand, much of this social waste is paid for by
those seeking residential homogeneity.163 To that extent, permitting exclusionary
amenities as a lawful alternative to overt discrimination might function as an excise tax
on residential homogeneity. It would be a wonderful coincidence if the costs imposed by
this tax were equivalent to the social costs of the resulting residential homogeneity, but
the likelihood of establishing a Pigouvian efficient tax are exceedingly low.164 That said,
in a society that values residential heterogeneity as a general matter, “taxing” exclusion in
this way may help ensure that people who wish to engage in this form of exclusion have
rather strong preferences for doing so.
Gary Becker, Richard Epstein, and others have argued that the market adequately
sanctions people who refuse to deal with African American customers by depriving them
of an important market.165 But the presence of strong and broad consumer demand for
segregated environments will, by the same token, reward developers who cater to that
demand. In a world where large numbers of Caucasians are willing to pay a premium for
neighborhoods that exhibit rather substantial racial homogeneity,166 the waste associated
with the provision of exclusionary amenities may provide the only significant penalty
suffered by an entrepreneur who satisfies these discriminatory preferences.
Exclusionary amenities strategies necessarily create a second kind of inefficiency:
They will be less precise than overt discrimination. Tiger Woods is not the only affluent
African American golfer. So a homeowners’ association that tries to use golf as a proxy
for race may not achieve complete racial homogeneity. This might be a good thing in
several respects. First, exposure to some racial heterogeneity, albeit a limited amount,
may result in preference changes that would not occur in a world of complete
homogeneity. It is not naïve to think that positive interactions with a “token” African
American neighbor would constrain a white resident’s future demand for racial
homogeneity.167 Second, exclusionary amenities strategies diminish the liberty of
members of the excluded group less than overt discrimination does. An African
American non-golfer can join a mandatory membership residential golf community, he
will just have to pay a premium to do so. As a result, we might expect that he will resent
the exclusionary device less. Finally, preferences for the good in question may change
over time. In recent years, African Americans have taken up golf in increasing
numbers.168 If this trend continues, then golf courses will no longer function effectively
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as exclusionary club goods, and Caucasians interested in racial homogeneity will have to
resort to other sorting devices.
For all these reasons then, the “inefficiencies” associated with exclusionary club
good strategies may be welfare enhancing for society as a whole. When communities are
forced to substitute exclusionary amenities for overt exclusionary admission criteria or
restraints on sales, this dynamic may actually enhance social welfare. That said, it is still
worth considering whether society would be better off trying to restrict exclusionary
amenities strategies, or leaving them unregulated, as the law currently does.
C.

Administrative Concerns

Let us focus on the use of exclusionary amenities to achieve objectionable ends,
such as the exclusion of African Americans from overwhelmingly Caucasian
neighborhoods. Should the law proscribe the creation of club goods that deter African
Americans from joining a particular community? Not necessarily. In a world where
courts are prone to error, and evidence of discriminatory intent is difficult to gather,
policing the provision of exclusionary amenities will often prove quite difficult. After
all, there is substantial demand for residential golf courses, and a desire for racial
homogeneity is not the only plausible explanation for a mandatory membership structure.
On the contrary, mandatory membership may be designed to combat free riding by those
who benefit from a golf course’s views and open space but do not contribute to its
upkeep. Moreover, mandatory membership might be designed as a pre-commitment
device for residents to contract for high levels of social interactions among neighborhood
residents.169 Finally, there may be alternative reasons, quite apart from racial bias, to
explain why golfers want to live among fellow golfers. For example, doing so may lower
the search costs associated with obtaining useful golf tips. As a result, it is arguably
appropriate to proscribe exclusionary amenities strategies only where there is clear
evidence that the club good in question would not have been procured but for the desire
to achieve a type of residential homogeneity that violates public policy interests.
Where the law does attempt to defeat exclusionary amenities strategies, some
governmental approaches will be superior to others. Given the concern about false
positives, it seems wise to police the financing mechanisms for club goods before
policing the provision of those club goods themselves. There is nothing objectionable
about mandatory membership in golf communities that charge all residents for the
positive externalities that the golf course confers on them. This means charging golfers
within a residential golf development for open space, views, and golf; and charging nongolfers for open space and views. In fact, many residential golf communities provide
such two-tiered membership structures,170 and even the ones that do not implicitly charge
169
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non-golfers by capitalizing the extra value of a view into the original purchase price of a
home. Accordingly, in instances where there is strong evidence to suggest that the
provision of exclusionary amenities promotes residential segregation, the appropriate
solution is not to ban residential golf communities, but rather to invalidate mandatory
membership schemes for golf-playing, which is racially skewed, as opposed to golfcourse-view-enjoyment, which one supposes to be race neutral.171 This approach is,
essentially, the unbundling strategy that is well-integrated into antitrust law.172
Developers could still build homes next to golf courses, but they could not mandate that
these homeowners purchase costly memberships in those courses or otherwise force
purchasers to bear the capitalized costs of golf course land acquisition and upkeep. The
unbundling strategy essentially eliminates the opportunity to use exclusionary amenities
as a discriminatory tax that falls hardest on members of undesirable groups.173
The prospect of inclusionary club goods brings to mind another remedial
prospect. Rather than require unbundling, the law might mandate bundling of a different
sort. Where there are substantial concerns about the use of exclusionary amenities to
promote homogeneity, the law might demand the coupling of exclusionary club goods
with inclusionary club goods. “Want to put a rock climbing wall in your new
development? No problem, just build a basketball court next door.” Such a coupling
scheme might produce a world with too few residential golf courses, but it would also
promote the construction of more basketball courts, which are probably undersupplied by
the market for the reasons developed in this paper. And even if such a mandate results in
a basketball court glut, the positive externalities associated with interracial relationships
established on the court seem to make basketball an activity worth subsidizing,
particularly in suburban residential communities. That said, unbundling is probably a
more precise tool than this form of super-bundling, in the sense that it would be difficult
171
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to calibrate the optimal level of extra bundling to offset the adverse consequences of an
exclusionary amenities approach.
This paper has argued that divergent preferences for amenities and activities
among members of different racial groups are not innocuous because those divergences
create an opening for those interested in promoting residential segregation. Perhaps the
most promising strategy for combating the use of exclusionary amenities is to try to alter
the preferences of the group that is targeted for exclusionary treatment. Tiger Woods’s
recent success on the PGA tour correlated with a staggering increase in the percentage of
African Americans who identify themselves as avid golf fans.174 Relatedly, the Tiger
Woods Foundation has sought to provide golfing opportunities to minority and
disadvantaged youth.175 These demographic developments might render residential golf
courses poor race-oriented exclusionary club goods in the years ahead.176 Group
disparities in preferences for club goods are socially constructed. As such, they may be
amenable to concerted efforts by government or private groups to homogenize
preferences as a means of thwarting insidious exclusionary amenities strategies.177
D.

Promoting Exclusionary Strategies

Given society’s interest in promoting diversity among communities, as well as
diversity within communities, there are arguably instances in which the law should
promote the use of exclusionary amenities. Consider the efforts by deaf Americans to
establish a community made up largely of sign language speakers in Laurent, South
Dakota.178 There are strong welfarist arguments for such a residential arrangement, given
the network effects and economies of scale associated with bringing speakers of this
language together in one place. There are sound political representation arguments as
well, and Laurent organizers are particularly excited about the prospect of electing
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representatives who will be forceful advocates for their interests.179 At present, not that
many hearing people will want to live in a community where sign language is the linga
franca. But if Laurent becomes economically successful, one can imagine that those who
are not fluent in sign language moving to Laurent in search of economic opportunity. To
curtail such behavior, Laurent may find it worthwhile to invest in exclusionary amenities.
In instances where a religious, linguistic, or other minority community genuinely
requires some measure of critical mass to thrive, it may be appropriate for the state to
subsidize the creation of exclusionary amenities or, failing that, at least to remain neutral.
In such an instance, neutrality would mean permitting the enforcement of covenants and
equitable servitudes designed to support the creation and maintenance of these kinds of
club goods. As long as courts are capable of distinguishing between those instances in
which exclusion furthers policy objectives and those in which exclusion undermines
policy objectives, there is no reason to demand that states police the types of activities in
the same way that they police strategies designed to exclude marginalized racial minority
groups from affluent neighborhoods.
V.

Conclusion

Individuals care about the identities of their neighbors, and are willing to expend
substantial resources to recruit the desirable and deter the undesirable from moving in.
When the law prevents individuals from using overt discrimination or discriminatory
advertising to control the composition of their neighborhoods, these individuals may
employ more subtle strategies for accomplishing the same objective. Namely, developers
or community residents may procure exclusionary amenities that cause people to select
into or out of particular communities. Exclusionary amenities will be selected, not on the
basis of how much inherent utility they provide for residents, but on the basis of how
effectively they cause self sorting by desirable and undesirable residents and how clearly
they designate focal points to which housing consumers can respond. These goods would
not be procured at the same levels if overt discrimination were permitted. The inability to
exclude functions as an inducement to spend.
The phenomenon identified here involves high stakes. In recent decades the most
important trend in American residential development and property law more generally
has been the rise of common interest communities.180 These communities spend more
than thirty billion dollars each year maintaining these amenities.181 This paper raises the
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troubling possibility that exclusionary motivations explain some of these expenditures. It
also posits that starkly heterogeneous preferences for consumer goods among members of
different racial groups may be far more troubling than previously thought.
Exclusionary amenities are not necessarily bad things. There may be instances in
which they are socially desirable. And inclusionary amenities might function as a tool
for promoting residential heterogeneity. This essay suggests that there are certain
circumstances in which exclusionary amenities undermine important public policy
concerns, and in those circumstances the law ought to police them through
antidiscrimination law or property doctrine. But as a general matter, exclusionary
amenities are less problematic than overt discrimination. So this essay sounds a
cautionary note, and argues against unduly vigorous legal campaigns to stamp out all uses
of this exclusionary device. Indeed, when exclusionary amenities in ways that undermine
important public policy interests, the best government response may be to adopt policies
that seek to homogenize preferences for the club good in question.
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